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iChapter 1.
Multicountry Model
In this chapter, I provide more details on computing equilibrium paths for the dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model analyzed in the main text. Speciﬁcally, I report the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions before and after detrending variables that grow over time. I then discuss the algorithm
used to compute the equilibrium paths on a parallel processor. Codes and documentation
are available at my website (www.minneapolisfed.org/research/economists/emcgrattan.html).
1.1. Maximization problems
The model used here is a version of McGrattan and Prescott (2010) with constant taxes and
a simpliﬁed portfolio choice. I let i index countries, i = 1,...,I, and j index multinational
companies. Without loss of generality, I will work with a representative multinational,


































































































where Ni is the number of locations in country i, Mj is the stock of technology capital,
Z
j
i is a composite input to multinationals j in country i, A
j
i is the level of technology
parameter faced by multinationals j in country i, K
j
T,i is the stock of tangible capital
used by multinationals j in country i, K
j
I,i is the stock of intangible capital used by
multinationals j in country i, and L
j
i is the labor supplied to multinationals j in country
i. Below, I assume that A
j
it = Ai(1 + γA)t if i = j and Aiσit(1 + γA)t otherwise.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the multinational j with respect to the labor inputs and
capital stocks are given by
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(1 − τli)WitLit + (1 − τd)Di
t + rbtBit + κit
 
,
where τli and τd are tax rates on labor and company distributions, and rbt is the after-tax
return on lending/borrowing. I assume that country i has a population of size Nit. Note
that the measure of a country’s production locations is proportional to its population.
Hence, I use the same notation for both variables and set the constant of proportionality
equal to one (without loss of generality).
If U(c,l) = logc + ψ log(1 − l), then the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to Ci, Li,
and Bi for the household in country i are
λpt = βtUc,it = βtNit/Cit
λ(1 − τli)Witpt = βtUl,it = ψβt/(1 − Lit/Nit)
pt
pt+1
= 1 + rb,t+1,
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with household i’s budget constraint.
1.1.3. Market clearing






































it, i = 1,...,I.
1.2. Detrended variables
I’ll use lowercase letters for growth-detrended variables. Speciﬁcally, let
cit =
Cit












































































4where γY is the growth rate of output, γy is the growth rate of per capita output, and γA
is the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). Using the production technology, I
can determine the growth rate of total output on the balanced growth path:
(1 + γY) = (1 + γA)(1 + γN)
φ (1 + γY)
φ (1 + γY)
αT(1−φ)
  (1 + γY)
αI(1−φ) (1 + γN)
(1−αT−αI)(1−φ)
= (1 + γA)
1
(1−αT −αI)(1−φ) (1 + γN)
1−(αT +αI)(1−φ)
(1−αT −αI)(1−φ) ,
where γN is the growth rate of the population (and locations) on a balanced growth path.
1.3. Detrended ﬁrst-order conditions

























































































































cit = (1 − τli)witlit + (1 − τd)di
t/Nit
5+ (1 + rbt)bit − (1 + γY )bi,t+1Nit+1/Nit + κit (1.3.10)







pt/pt+1 = 1 + r
j










i (1 − δM)
 
/(1 − τpj) (1.3.13)
pt/pt+1 = (1 + γy)ci,t+1/(βcit) (1.3.14)
(1 − τli)wit = ψcit/(1 − lit) (1.3.15)




















































+ τliwitlit + τddi
t/Nit. (1.3.20)
1.4. Adding adjustment costs
In the 104-country version of the model, small adjustment costs to investment were added
to aid in the computations. Numerical problems arise because of investment hitting cor-
ners. In this section, I consider adding adjustment costs, which eventually were driven
close to zero given a good guess of the ﬁnal solution.
Let ϕT(X/K), ϕI(X/K), and ϕM(X/K) be the costs of adjusting investment in tan-
gible capital, plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, and technology capital, respectively. The
6capital accumulation equations are now given by
K
j

















































The Lagrangian for the multinational j can be written as follows:















































































































































































7where terms like ϕTt and ϕ′
Tt are shorthand for the functions evaluated at the time t ratio
of investment to capital.
1.5. BEA accounts
I now apply the same procedure as the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to set up
the national and international accounts for the model economy. I’ll use the notation Ji
to mean the set of multinationals incorporated in i. This implies the following for gross






















































































• GNPit = GDPit + Net factor receipts less payments


















Portfolio interest: rbtBit if Bit ≥ 0
Net factor payments (to l  = i)















Portfolio interest: rbtBit if Bit ≤ 0
8• Balance of payments: Current account = Financial account
































Portfolio interest: rbtBit if Bit ≥ 0
Net factor payments (to l  = i)
































Change in portfolio: Bi,t+1 − Bit
Next, consider the accounts for the two-country case that will be central to the propo-
sitions that come later. For ease of exposition, let i be Ireland and r be the rest of world. I
index companies in Ireland by d, which I’ll refer to as “Domestic.” I’ll index rest-of-world
(ROW) companies by f, which I’ll refer to as “Foreign.”
The current account (CA) is the sum of net exports (NX) plus net factor receipts
(NFR) less net factor payments (NFP):









































= (1 − τli)WitLit + (1 − τd)D
d



































T,it is the total tangible capital stock in




I,it is total plant-speciﬁc investment in country i. In writing
net factor payments, I assume that Bit < 0 and therefore net factor interest is paid by
Ireland to rest of world. I also assume that multinationals expense their investment of
technology capital at home.









T,it + Bi,t+1 − Bit. (1.5.2)
By the balance of payments, FA less CA is equal to zero and therefore







T,it + Bi,t+1 − Bit
− (1 − τli)WitLit − (1 − τd)Dd










= Cit + Bi,t+1 − Bit
− (1 − τli)WitLit − (1 − τd)Dd
t − rbtBit − κit.
As the last equation makes clear, the balancing of payments internationally is consistent
with the balancing of budgets domestically. (Compare the last equation to the budget in
Section 1.2.)
1.6. Propositions for a two-country version
In this section, I provide more details in proofs of the main propositions (repeated here)
for the two-country model.
10In this version of the model, there are two countries: i (e.g., Ireland) and r (e.g.,
ROW). I assume from the start that Ireland is small in size relative to the ROW. Companies
in Ireland are indexed by d (Domestic), and companies from the ROW are indexed by f
(Foreign).
I compute the transition of these countries as they go from fully closed (σt = 0)
to suﬃciently open (σt ≥ σ∗) after some date t = t∗ so that the small country shuts
down investment in technology capital. In this case, there is only a small amount of
multinational activity of Irish ﬁrms in the rest of the world. Even though the ﬁrms have
built up technology capital at home, which could be used abroad, they have no intangible or
tangible capital abroad when the countries open up. Given they are planning to decumulate
the technology capital, it is not worth it for these ﬁrms to build up a lot of tangible and
intangible capital abroad for temporary use. Therefore, when countries open up, the
amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) done by Irish ﬁrms is small.
Therefore, to make the mathematics simpler, I assume from the start that Irish com-
panies do not operate in the ROW (that is, Y d
rt = 0 for all t). This assumption makes the
mathematical derivations easier and changes the quantitative results little.
In addition to restrictions on foreign direct investment, there could also be restrictions
on portfolio ﬂows. I start with the case of free ﬂows in portolio investments, which is simpler
to analyze. I then show how things change if I restrict portfolio investments along with
foreign direct investments.
1.6.1. Without constraints on portfolio ﬂows



















































































(1 − τli)WitLit + (1 − τd)Dd
t + rbtBit + κit
 
.
The ROW households solve a similar problem except that they also receive an additional
income {ǫt}, which is added to household income in order to implement a numerical “trick”














(1 − τlr)WrtLrt + (1 − τd)D
f
t + rbtBrt + κrt + ǫt
 
.(1.6.1)
The additional income given to ROW households is equal to
ǫt = ˜ Cit + ˜ Crt + ˜ X
d
T,it + ˜ X
f
T,it + ˜ X
f
T,rt + ˜ X
d
I,it + ˜ X
f
I,it + ˜ X
f
I,rt + ˜ M
d
t + ˜ M
f
t − ˜ Yit + ˜ Yrt,
12where the tilde ( ˜ ) denotes the equilibrium values for a model with rbt = (1 + γy)/β − 1
for t = 1,..., t∗. Alternatively, the income adjustment can be written in terms of incomes
rather than products as follows:
ǫt = ˜ Cit + ˜ Crt − (1 − τli) ˜ Wit˜ Lit − (1 − τlr) ˜ Wrt˜ Lrt − (1 − τd)
 
˜ Dd




− ˜ κit − ˜ κrt.
Adding the income to the ROW budget in (1.6.1) ensures that the equilibrium of the
ǫ-economy is the same as one with ǫt = 0 for all t and rbt equal to (1+γy)/β−1 for t ≤ t∗.
For Propositions 1–3, I assume that the ǫt are nonzero for t = 1,...,t∗. For t > t∗,
ǫt = 0. I refer to this case as the ǫ-economy. Figure 1 shows the diﬀerence between the
interest rates with and without the ROW income adjustment, which is shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 1. The small country’s output, labor, and capital stocks in the ǫ-economy
are at or below their historical trends between t = 1 and t = t∗, while consumption is
above. The reverse is true for the large country.
Proof. Suppose that at t = 1, consumption cit in Ireland is above its historical trend,
ci1 > ci0. Then, between t = 2 and t = t∗, cit = ci1 since
cit =
β (1 + rbt)
1 + γy
ci,t−1, t = 2,...,t
∗
= ci,t−1 t = 2,...,t∗,
where the ﬁrst equation follows from (1.3.14) and (1.3.16), and the second equation follows
from the fact that rbt = (1 + γy)/β − 1 by choice of {ǫt} adjustment.
From the intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition of Irish households (1.3.15), with labor























, t = 1,...,t∗, (1.6.2)
13where yit/lit is total labor productivity. I can use this relation to determine what happens
to employment between t = 0 and t = 1.
To do that, I take the ratio of labor productivity in the ﬁrst period relative to its





(1 − li1)/(1 − li0)
. (1.6.3)
Since output depends on beginning of period capital stocks, which are given and equal to







(1/li0 − 1)/(1/li0 − li0/li1)
. (1.6.4)
Let x = li1/li0, a = 1 − (1 − φ)(1 − αT − αI), and b = 1/li0, c = ci1/ci0. Now, I can
restate the problem of determining what happens to employment between t = 0 and t = 1




, a ∈ (0,1),b ≥ 1,c > 1, (1.6.5)
is less or greater than 1, since x is the ratio of labor inputs in the two periods. The left-
hand side of (1.6.5) is everywhere increasing in x, and the right-hand side is everywhere
decreasing, which means there is a unique solution. At x = 1, the left-hand side of (1.6.5)
exceeds 1 and the right-hand side is equal to 1, which means that the intersection must
lie below 1. Thus, li1 < li0. Furthermore, yi1 < yi0 since capital stocks are ﬁxed. With
curvature in the production function, it must be the case that (true) productivity rises
initially, yi1/li1 > yi0/li0.
If t∗ > 2, then in period t = 2, output and labor must fall further relative to the
historic trend, because domestic capital stocks fall between the ﬁrst and second periods.
To demonstrate this, I ﬁrst substitute returns to capital in (1.3.7)–(1.3.9) into the dynamic
Euler equations in order to relate capital-output ratios to the return rbt; that is,














for the period t = 2,...,t∗. Note that the last equation has only one term because
the Irish ﬁrms are assumed to operate only domestically. If the return rbt is equal to
(1+γy)/β −1, then the capital-output ratios must be equal to their historical levels prior
to FDI liberalization. Using this fact along with the production technologies in (1.3.5), it

































































where I am using the fact that lit = ld
it and yit = yd
it in t ≤ t∗. If labor productivity is on
trend and consumption is equal to the level in period 1, then it follows from (1.6.3) that
li2 < li1, which in turn implies that li2 < li0. In other words,
li2 = 1 −
(1 + τc)














It follows immediately that yi2 < yi1, which in turn implies that yi2 < yi0.
Since the interest rate rbt does not change between t = 2 and t∗, it must be the case
that yit = yi2 and lit = li2, t ≤ t∗. This follows from the intratemporal condition and the
fact that capital-output ratios and consumptions relative to trend are constant.
15The same arguments as above can be made for the large country. However, because
the global resource constraint must hold, the paths relative to trend for the large country
must be reversed. To see this, recall the global resource constraint prior to FDI openness:


















If consumption is above trend between t = 1 and t = t∗ in both Ireland and the ROW,
it follows from the arguments above that output and investments are below trend in both
countries. In fact, output and investments must be down by the same percentage between
t = 2 and t = t∗ −1 because capital-output ratios are on trend. In this case, I can rewrite
(1.6.6) as


















< Nici0 + Nrcr0 (1.6.7)
for t = 2,...,t∗ − 1, which leads to a contradiction of the claim that both consumptions
are initially above their historical trends. The same logic can be used to prove that both
consumptions are not below their historical trends initially.
Finally, I need to show that consumption is initially above trend in Ireland, which is
the recipient of future foreign direct investment, and initially below trend for the ROW,
which is the source of the foreign direct investment. This follows from the fact that
there is no change in eﬀective TFP for the ROW when σit > 0 because yd
rt = 0 for all t by
assumption. For Ireland, on the other hand, eﬀective TFP is higher because multinationals
in the ROW use their technology capital in Ireland when FDI is allowed and, therefore,
y
f
it > 0 for t > t∗.
To summarize, I’ve shown that
• ci1 > ci0, cit = ci1, t = 2,...,t∗;
• cr1 < cr0, crt = cr1, t = 2,...,t∗;
16• yi1 < yi0, yi2 < yi1, yit = yi2, t = 2,...,t∗;
• yr1 > yr0, yr2 > yr1, yrt = yr2, t = 2,...,t∗;
• li1 < li0, li2 < li1, lit = li2, t = 2,...,t∗;
• lr1 > lr0, lr2 > lr1, lrt = lr2, t = 2,...,t∗;
• yi1/li1 > yi0/li0, yit/lit = yi0/li0, t = 2,...,t∗;














T,rt/yr0, t = 2,...,t∗.
Proposition 2. The small country’s GDP and GNP in the ǫ-economy initially, after the
announcement, rise above their historical trends and then fall below trend between t = 2
and t = t∗. The reverse is true for the large country.

















I,it = 0 and therefore GDP is domestic output
less investments in plant-speciﬁc intangible capital and technology capital by domestic
companies. To show that Irish GDP is above its historical trend in t = 1, I must show that















































where the ﬁrst equality uses the capital accumulation equation after detrending all vari-
ables, the second equality follows from the fact that the capital-output ratio in the second
period is equal to the historical capital-output ratio, the inequality follows from Propo-
sition 1, and the ﬁnal inequality follows from the fact that δI ≤ 1. Thus, plant-speciﬁc
intangible investment must fall by more than output. The same argument can be made
for technology capital. Therefore, GDP must be above trend in t = 1.
GNP is equal to GDP in the ﬁrst period because there are no net factor incomes if
Bi0 = 0 and FDI income is zero. Thus, in the ﬁrst period, when the policy is announced,
net factor incomes for the period are already determined and GNP must equal GDP.
In the second period, since the capital-output ratios are at their historical trends,
GDP in Ireland must be below its own trend by the same amount as output. GNP, on
the other hand, is not necessarily equal to GDP because bond repayments are made by
Ireland to the ROW. In other words,
GNPit = GDPit + rbtBit,
for t = 1,...,t∗−1, where Bi1 = 0, Bi2 > 0, and Bit < 0 for t = 3,...,t∗−1. The pattern
of Irish debt can be determined from net exports in the transition period, since
NXit = Bit+1 − (1 + rbt)Bit
and since net exports are equal to GDP less domestic consumption and investment—and
all three of these variables are constant relative to their historical trends between t = 2
and t = t∗ − 1. Thus, net exports must also be constant relative to its historical trend.
In t = t∗, GDP falls further below its historical trend than output has fallen because
18investment of foreign multinationals in both tangible and plant-speciﬁc intangible capital
rises above zero. GDP is lower because of the rise in plant-speciﬁc intangible investment.
The arguments made for the small country can be made for the large country, but the
direction of change is reversed for the periods t = 1 to t = t∗.
Figures 3 and 4 show the transition paths of consumption, labor, output, capital,
GDP, and GNP in the case that income adjustments are not made to the ROW budget
constraints. These are the analogues of Figures 3 and 4 in the main text, which displayed
the results assuming a small adjustment in ǫt was made to keep the interest rate constant
in transition.
1.6.2. With constraints on portfolio ﬂows
If portfolio ﬂows are restricted over the same period as FDI ﬂows, then the interest rate is
no longer (approximately) constant prior to ﬁnancial liberalization. In this case, deriving
speciﬁc analytic solutions for all of the paths of variables of interest is not easy. Instead,
I consider whether variables are above or below trend and show a graphic comparison of
the economies with and without portfolio restrictions.
Proposition 3. The small country’s output and labor with full capital account restrictions
are below their historical trend between t = 1 and t = t∗. The reverse is true for the large
country.
Proof. If, in t = 1, consumption in Ireland rises relative to its historical trend, ci1 > ci0,











, t = 1,...,t∗,
implies that labor and output fall initially. With capital ﬁxed, labor falls more than output.
With no borrowing or lending allowed across countries, total investment yi1 − ci1
19must be below trend. With returns equated across assets, investment in all three types
of assets—tangible capital, plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, and technology capital—must
be below trend.
In period t = 2, output and labor must fall further because domestic capital stocks
are lower between the ﬁrst and second periods when investment in t = 1 is below trend.
Households cannot borrow from abroad; thus, output, investment, and labor continue to
fall until t = t∗, and net exports remain equal to zero until the restrictions on FDI are
relaxed.
Again, the same arguments can be made for the large country, but because the global
resource constraint must hold, the paths relative to trend for the large country must be
reversed. Because the small country is the recipient of future FDI while the large country
is its source, the initial consumption in the small country must be above its historical
trend, and the initial consumption in the large country must be below. Otherwise, the
global resource constraint would be violated.
Figures 5 through 8 compare the transitions with and without portfolio restrictions.
Not surprisingly, the transitions are more gradual with portfolio restrictions, since the small
country cannot immediately take advantage of the higher eﬀective TFP that is coming in
the future.
1.7. Computation of a general I-country version
Now, I describe the algorithm used to compute equilibrium paths in a general I-country
version of the model over T periods.
Let me start with some notation. Let P be a np-dimensional vector of prices and
transfers, where np = T − 1 + 2TI and the vector includes T − 1 interest rates, TI wage
rates, and TI transfers. Let Qi be a nq-dimensional vector of quantities for country i, where
20nq = 4T + 2TI and the vector includes T country-i consumptions, T country-i aggregate
labor supplies, T country-i next period debt holdings, T investments in technology capital
made by companies from country i, TI investments in tangible capital made by companies
from country i at home and abroad in all other countries, and TI investments in plant-
speciﬁc tangible capital made by companies from country i at home and abroad in all other
countries. Let Q be a nq × I matrix with column i given by Qi.
Next, consider the steps of the algorithm to compute equilibrium P∗ and Q∗ on a
parallel computer. That is, ﬁnd P∗ and Q∗ such that
0 = F (P,Q)
0 = Gi (P,Qi), i = 1,...,I,
where F is a np-dimensional function and Gi is a nq-dimensional function.
The ﬁrst-order conditions stacked up in F are T − 1 global resource conditions in
(1.3.17), TI market-clearing conditions for labor in (1.3.19), and TI conditions relating
transfers to tax revenues in (1.3.20).
The ﬁrst-order conditions stacked up in Gi are the budget constraint (1.3.10), the
household intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition that combines (1.3.15) and (1.3.6), the re-
lation between the interest rate and marginal rates of substitution that combines (1.3.14)
and (1.3.16), and all of the dynamic Euler equations that combine (1.3.7) through (1.3.13).
Conditions (1.3.1)–(1.3.5) are used to construct dividends, capital stocks, and outputs.
1. On the master node (node 0), read in all inputs and initialize parameter vectors,
exogenous time paths, and initial guesses for the vector of prices P and vector of
quantities Q. When ﬁrst starting, use steady-state values, which are read in. (See
below for details on computing the steady states with actual cross-country data.)
212. Broadcast (MPI BCAST) parameters, initial conditions for capital and debt, and ex-
ogenous time paths (for tax rates, technology levels, populations, degrees of openness,
and borrowing constraints) to all processors.
3. The outer loop of the code iterates on the equilibrium price vector. The current
price vector and an initial guess for the quantity vectors Qi are inputs (along with all
parameters) to each country i subroutine. (There are two kinds of countries: those
with technology capital at a corner and those with positive levels of technology capital.
For those at a corner, only a subset of ﬁrst-order conditions needs to be solved.) Each
country is assigned to a processor. Depending on the capacity of the machine, there
might be only one country per processor or more than one.
4. The inner loops of the code—which are run inside each of the country i subroutines—
iterate on quantity vectors (for a given vector of prices). In other words, Q∗
i is found
(as a function of the current price vector) that solves the set of ﬁrst-order conditions
Gi(P,Qi) = 0 given P. The results are passed back to the outer loop along with
derivatives of F with respect to all variables.
5. Back in the outer loop, prices are updated via a Newton-Raphson algorithm. If there
is convergence, the results are written out. Otherwise, new prices and quantities are
broadcast to the processors and the algorithm continues at step 4 above.
6. The results written out by the code are analogues of BEA variables derived above.
If T and I are large, it is best to move gradually from the steady state (with no change
in Nit or σit over time) to the parameterization of interest. Also, if analytic derivatives
are used in ﬁnding the ﬁxed points for P and Q that solve the ﬁrst-order conditions, then
the codes run considerably faster.
22Chapter 2.
Data Sources
For the 104-country benchmark model, I use the following series that are available from
the World Development Indicators:
• GDP in current U.S. dollars (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
• GDP in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD)
• Total population (SP.POP.TOTL)
• Foreign direct investment, net inﬂows, in current U.S. dollars (BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD)
• Portfolio investment, excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities’ reserves, in
current U.S. dollars (BN.KLT.PTXL.CD)
The code setupdat.m loads in these raw data and constructs the relevant time series for
the analysis.
When I restrict myself to countries with balance of payments data available through
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), I use variable X4555 for the inward foreign direct
investment and the sum of variables X4652 and X4602 for the net portfolio investment.
Data sources for employment shares used in Figures 6–8 in the main text are the
OECD and BEA, speciﬁcally,
• OECD.Stat Inward activity of multinationals
• OECD Factbook 2010
• FDIUS Establishment Data for 2002, Table A1.9
23• USDIA 2004 Final Benchmark Data, Table I.H3
The codes plotccemp.m, plotusempi.m, and plotusempo.m load in these data and plot
predicted and actual employment shares shown in Figures 6–8 in the main text. The ﬁgures
in the main text use manufacturing data, which are readily available for many countries




Values for Ai0 and σi0 are set so that the initial values for real per capita GDP and the
ratio of inward FDI to GDP are the same in the model and the data. Speciﬁcally, the
Matlab code compsteady.m reads in the data (generated by the code setupdat.m discussed
in the previous section) and ﬁnds {Ai0,σi0} for all i such that the initial conditions for
the model per capita GDP and FDI to GDP ratios are the same. Values for Ni0 are taken
from actual data.
Time paths are set as follows. Technology levels are held on trend, Ait = Ai0. Popu-
lations are set equal to values in the WDI data discussed earlier. Values for the paths of
openness, σit, are set so that the trends in ratios of inward FDI to GDP are consistent in
the model and the data.
Fixed parameters are taken from McGrattan and Prescott (2010) who compare the
United States and rest of world. For tax series, I use the averages of the sample paths in
their study. In the next section, I do sensitivity analysis to determine if these choices have
an impact on the results.
25Chapter 4.
Sensitivity Analyses
In this chapter, I report the results of various sensitivity analyses. The ﬁrst set of experi-
ments considers the impact on the transition to FDI openness as I vary model parameters,
including the assumption of perfect-foresight expectations. In the second set of experi-
ments, I vary time paths of tax rates that were ﬁxed in the benchmark parameterization.
Then, I consider alternative sources for employment shares and balance of payments data.
Finally, I rerun the growth regressions for both data and model, varying the set of countries
included in the sample and the choice of independent variables.
4.1. Alternative parameters
In this section, I describe how the transition path for the two-country version of the model
changes as I vary key parameters. Here, I’ll consider the impact on GDP of the timing
of opening, relative country sizes, the share of technology capital, the degree of openness,
and expectations about future openness.
Figure 9 shows how the path changes as I vary four of the key parameters. The dark
line in all graphs is the benchmark shown in Figure 4 for the small country. The other
lines are results as I vary the date after which FDI is allowed t∗, the relative population
sizes Nr/Ni, the share of technology capital φ, and the degree of openness after σ∗.
The ﬁrst set of results in Figure 9 shows that the timing of opening matters little
for the magnitude of the decline in GDP unless the enactment of the policy is immediate.
However, even in that case, there must still be a decline given the large increase in intangible
investments that takes place.
The second set of results in Figure 9 shows that the initial declines and eventual
26increases in GDP are ampliﬁed with the relative populations. This result is not surprising
given that the impact of FDI depends on how large the technology capital is abroad. The
larger Nr/Ni, the larger the gap.
The third set of results in Figure 9 shows the impact of increasing the share of tech-
nology capital. The smaller this share φ, the smaller the incentive for FDI and the smaller
the impact of FDI openness.
The ﬁnal set of results in Figure 9 shows the impact of increasing the parameter
governing how much FDI is allowed in. This parameter, which has a one-to-one impact on
country TFP, ampliﬁes the movements—both up and down—in GDP.
Figure 9 and earlier results shown in Figure 8 comparing the transitions with and
without portfolio restrictions also provide an answer to the following question: How do the
results change if the future path for σit is not known with certainty? For example, suppose
the Irish did not know until t∗ that FDI would be allowed in during the following period.
In this case, the path of GDP would be on the historical trend before t∗ and would then
follow the same path as the ﬁrst curve in panel A of Figure 9. In other words, at t∗ there
would be a decline due to increased intangible investment, followed by an increase when
capital markets opened. The transition would look similar to a situation in which the Irish
faced tight constraints on their portfolio investments. There would be little movement in
GDP relative to its historical trend until enactment of the policy change.
4.2. Time-varying tax rates
The benchmark simulation has time variation in only two exogenous series: population
and the degree of openness. Other exogenous variables such as tax rates were assumed to
be constant over the sample. In this section, I show that this choice does not aﬀect the
main results.
27Speciﬁcally, I rerun the benchmark simulation with a time-varying path for each one of
the three tax rates. Starting with the tax on dividends, I assume that all countries start in
1980 with a rate of 28 percent, which linearly falls to 0 by 2025. Thus, in 2005, they are at
12 percent and expected to continue falling. If I recompute the annual growth rates relative
to the United States between 1980 and 2005, I ﬁnd that the results are almost exactly the
same as before. (See Figure 9 and Table 4 in the main text.) The correlation between this
annual growth rate and the initial level of per capita GDP relative to the United States
is 0.05, which is the same as in the benchmark simulation. And the regression of growth
on initial GDP and the ratio of FDI to GDP produces the same regression results with, in
particular, a coeﬃcient on FDI to GDP of 0.046.
If instead of the tax rate on dividends, I assume that the tax on labor and consumption
(i.e., the labor wedge) falls linearly from 34 percent to 0 over the period 1980–2025, then
I again ﬁnd similar results to the benchmark. The correlation between growth and initial
GDP is 0.055, and the coeﬃcient on FDI to GDP in the growth regression is 0.045.
Finally, I rerun the experiment with time-varying tax rates on proﬁts. Reducing the
tax rates on proﬁts for all countries from 37 percent to 0 over the period 1980–2025 implies
a correlation of growth and initial GDP of 0.056 and a coeﬃcient in the growth regression of
0.03 percent. Thus, in this case, the impact of FDI on GDP appears to the econometrician
to be even smaller than in the benchmark simulation. But in both cases, the economic
signiﬁcance is small.
4.3. Employment share data
As an external check, I compared the model’s predictions of employment shares with
actual data. I used data for manufacturing industries, which are readily available in many
countries and most relevant for FDI over the period 1980–2005. However, for inward FDI
in the United States, I have comparable data for both manufacturing and all industries.
28The countries with available data cover 88 percent of employment in foreign-owned
manufacturing establishments in the United States and 75 percent of employment in all
foreign-owned establishments in the United States. Figure 10 shows the predicted and
actual shares for manufacturing. (This is the same as Figure 7 in the main text and
is shown here for convenience.) Figure 11 shows the predicted and actual shares for all
industries. The correlations between the predicted and actual shares are high in both
cases.
4.4. IMF balance of payments data
The benchmark simulation is based on a 104-country model parameterized with data from
the World Development Indicators. In this section, I report results for a 50-country version
of the model parameterized with data from the IMF Balance of Payments.
Figure 12 is the analogue of Figure 9 in the main text, except that I use the 50-country
sample and IMF data. The main diﬀerence in country coverage is in terms of countries
with low initial levels of per capita GDP relative to the United States. However, the main
result is the same: the data generated by the model show no obvious relationship between
capital restrictions and economic performance.
4.5. Growth regressions
In this section, I explore several variants of the speciﬁcation for the growth regression
analyzed in the main text. The main results of the exercise are shown in Table 1, which
shows the benchmark speciﬁcation along with several alternatives. The key ﬁnding is that
in all cases that I explore, the predicted change in the growth rate due to a change in FDI
openness is economically insigniﬁcant.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 1 is the benchmark case using the full sample of 104 countries.
29Recall that the coeﬃcients on the ratio of FDI to GDP are too small to be economically
relevant for either the data or model. In the case of the data, the coeﬃcient is also
statistically insigniﬁcant. If the 19 smallest countries—those with populations less than
0.5 percent of the United States—are dropped, then the coeﬃcient on FDI to GDP is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for either the model or the data. If the 20 most advanced
countries—those with technology parameters over 85 percent of the United States—are
dropped, then the coeﬃcients for the model and data are roughly the same, but still not
economically signiﬁcant. If population is added to the list of right-hand-side variables, then
the impact of FDI is essentially zero in the model. Countries with large populations (and,
hence, many production locations) are likely to have sizable domestic technology capital
and rely less on inward FDI. In the data, as before, the coeﬃcient on FDI is insigniﬁcant.
30Chapter 5.
Summary of Welfare and Growth Gains
In Table 2, I report welfare and growth gains from the counterfactual experiments. These
are also shown graphically in Figures 10 and 11 in the main text.
In some cases, binding nonnegativity constraints on investment made it diﬃcult (if
not impossible) to run the counterfactuals. Thus, not all countries in the sample are
represented in Table 2. But, the countries included span a wide range of sizes relative
to the United States. And, as the ﬁgures in the main text demonstrate, these gains are
inversely related to size.
31Appendix Figures and Tables
32  Figure 1. Interest Rate in the Two Country Model, with 
   and without the Adjustment to Large-Country Income   
Figure 2. Adjustment to Large Country Income Required to 






















Figure 3. Detrended Consumption, Output, and Labor over Time
      in the Two-Country Model without Portfolio Restrictions
                (initial steady state = 100 and εt=0 for all t)





















Figure 4. Detrended Capital Stocks, GDP, and GNP over Time
      in the Two-Country Model without Portfolio Restrictions
                  (initial steady state = 100 and εt=0 for all t)

























  Figure 5. A Comparison of Detrended Consumption and Labor
with and without Portfolio Restrictions in a Two-Country Model
                          (initial steady state = 100)









Tangible Capital without 
Portfolio Restrictions














  Figure 6. A Comparison of Detrended Output and Tangible Capital
    with and without Portfolio Restrictions in a Two-Country Model
                          (initial steady state = 100)
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  Figure 7. A Comparison of Detrended Intangible Capital Stocks
with and without Portfolio Restrictions in a Two-Country Model
                          (initial steady state = 100)

























  Figure 8. A Comparison of Detrended GDP and GNP with and 
        without Portfolio Restrictions in a Two-Country Model













    A. Time of Opening (t
*)                            B. Ratio of Populations (Nr/Ni)
C.  Technology Capital Share (φ)                   D. Degree of Openness (σ
*)
Figure 9. Detrended GDP over Time in the Two-Country Model
   without Portfolio Restrictions and Varying Model Parameters
























































Figure 10. Predicted vs. Actual Share of Total U.S. Employment
in Foreign Controlled Establishments by Country
























































Figure 11. Predicted vs. Actual Share of Total U.S. Employment
in Foreign Controlled Establishments by Country
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Figure 12. 1980 Real GDP and Predicted Growth Rates, 50-Country Sample
(Countries with average FDI/GDP > 2% labeled)
43Table 1. Impact of FDI on Per Capita GDP Growth
Regression: g = a0 + a1gdp0 + a2fdi/gdp
g = annual growth in real per capita GDP relative to U.S., 1980–2005 (U.S.=0)
gdp0 = real per capita GDP relative to U.S. in 1980 (U.S.=1)























Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
44Table 1. Impact of FDI on Per Capita GDP Growth (cont.)
Regression: g = a0 + a1gdp0 + a2fdi/gdp+ a3pop
g = annual growth in real per capita GDP relative to U.S., 1980–2005 (U.S.=0)
gdp0 = real per capita GDP relative to U.S. in 1980 (U.S.=1)
fdi/gdp = average ratio of FDI to GDP (in percent), 1980–2005


















Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
45Table 2. Growth and Welfare Gains
Country Relative Size Welfare Gains Growth Gains
United States (USA) 100 4 0.0
Japan (JPN) 52 9 0.0
Germany (DEU) 24 8 1.3
United Kingdom (GBR) 18 15 1.3
France (FRA) 18 13 1.5
Italy (ITA) 15 14 1.6
Brazil (BRA) 11 24 1.4
Canada (CAN) 10 25 1.4
Mexico (MEX) 8.8 26 1.5
Spain (ESP) 7.8 25 1.7
Saudi Arabia (SAU) 6.4 35 1.3
Korea (KOR) 3.5 35 2.0
Venezuela (VEN) 3.4 39 1.6
Australia (AUS) 5.6 32 1.9
Argentina (ARG) 5.6 30 1.7
Netherlands (NLD) 5.5 28 1.5
India (IND) 4.9 29 0.3
Sweden (SWE) 4.0 28 1.7
Turkey (TUR) 3.8 35 1.7
Belgium-Luxembourg (BEL) 3.8 18 1.6
Austria (AUT) 3.0 34 2.4
Denmark (DNK) 2.6 37 2.2
Norway (NOR) 2.3 44 2.3
Finland (FIN) 1.9 41 2.1
Indonesia (IDN) 1.7 50 2.3
Philippines (PHL) 1.7 51 2.2
Colombia (COL) 1.7 49 2.2
Portugal (PRT) 1.6 45 2.4
Peru (PER) 1.4 53 2.2
Algeria (DZA) 1.3 56 2.4
Nigeria (NGA) 1.3 57 2.3
Egypt (EGY) 1.3 59 2.5
Thailand (THA) 1.2 53 2.4
New Zealand (NZL) 1.0 55 2.7
Pakistan (PAK) 1.0 60 2.4
Ireland (IRL) 1.0 56 2.4
Malaysia (MYS) .94 64 2.4
Chile (CHL) .87 59 2.5
Morocco (MAR) .75 60 2.6
Singapore (SGP) .71 16 0.4
Guatemala (GTM) .47 77 2.6
46Table 2. Growth and Welfare Gains (cont.)
Country Relative Size Welfare Gains Growth Gains
Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) .47 79 2.6
Ecuador (ECU) .44 74 2.6
Dominican Republic (DOM) .40 76 2.9
El Salvador (SLV) .38 73 3.0
Kenya (KEN) .34 86 2.8
Costa Rica (CRI) .33 81 3.1
Tunisia (TUN) .33 80 3.1
Bolivia (BOL) .27 83 2.4
Cameroon (CMR) .29 85 3.7
Sri Lanka (LKA) .23 83 3.2
Gabon (GAB) .20 95 3.0
Jordan (JOR) .20 93 3.5
Honduras (HND) .20 92 3.3
Haiti (HTI) .19 93 3.1
Iceland (ISL) .19 82 3.5
Zambia (ZMB) .15 97 3.5
Senegal (SEN) .15 98 3.1
Ghana (GHA) .14 98 3.3
Cyprus (CYP) .12 98 3.0
Mozambique (MOZ) .11 98 3.2
Bahamas (BHS) .11 102 3.8
Guinea (GIN) .08 105 1.8
Mali (MLI) .08 108 3.2
Congo (COG) .08 108 3.1
Liberia (LBR) .07 71 2.3
Burkina Faso (BFA) .06 117 3.4
Benin (BEN) .06 120 3.3
Malawi (MWI) .06 121 3.5
Botswana (BWA) .05 173 4.3
Chad (TCD) .05 115 3.5
Fiji (FJI) .05 115 4.0
Togo (TGO) .05 394 6.9
Central Af. Rep. (CAF) .05 127 4.1
Mauritania (MRT) .04 211 6.0
Burundi (BDI) .03 126 2.9
Swaziland (SWZ) .03 274 5.7
Gambia (GMB) .02 287 6.9
Seychelles (SYC) .01 133 4.5
Solomon Is. (SLB) .01 458 7.3
Vanuatu (VUT) .01 173 4.1
St. Vincent (VCT) .01 211 6.2
Note: Countries are ordered by size relative to the United States. Those not shown encountered
numerical problems when computing the counterfactuals.
47References
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1980–2010, Balance of Payments, www.imfstatistics.
org/bop.
McGrattan, Ellen R., and Edward C. Prescott, 2010, “Technology Capital and the U.S. Cur-
rent Account,” American Economic Review, 100(4): 1493–1522.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010a, OECD.Stat, Inward
Activity of Multinationals by Industrial Sector, Activity of Multinationals, www.source
oecd.org.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010b, OECD.Stat, STAN
Database for Structural Analysis, Main Economic Indicators, www.sourceoecd.org.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010c, OECD Factbook 2010,
Employment in Foreign Aﬃliates, www.oecd-ilibrary.org.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 2007, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Establishment Data for
2002, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oﬃce).
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: 2004 Final Benchmark Data, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Oﬃce).
World Bank Group, 1960–2010, World Development Indicators, www.worldbank.org.
48